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We explore whether increases in China’s exports reduce exports of other emerging Asian 
economies. We find that correlations between Chinese export growth and that of other emerging 
Asian economies are actually positive (though often not significantly so), even after controlling 
for the effects of income growth of trading partners and real effective exchange rates. We also 
present results from a VAR estimation of aggregate trade equations on the relative importance of 
foreign income and exchange rates in the determination of Asian export growth. An important 
finding is that, while exchange rates do matter for export performance, the income growth of 
trading partners matters even more.  In addition, we examine specific products and find evidence 
that a considerable shifting of trade patterns is taking place, consistent with a ‘flying geese’ 
pattern in which China and ASEAN-4 move into the product space vacated by the NIEs. Overall, 
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Two men sought a Buddhist monk’s help to resolve their dispute. The first man told his side of 
the story, and the monk said: "You're right!" The second gave his side, and the monk said: 
“You're right!" A third person who was listening to all this protested to the monk: "These men 
have opposing views. How can you say you say they’re both right?” The monk thought for a bit 
and told him: "You're right too." 
 
1. Introduction 
Discussions of trade flows in Asia highlight two opposing views on the nature of the 
trade links between China and emerging Asia.
1  Under the first view, China and other Asian 
economies are comrades. They share mutual benefits from the increased incomes of Chinese 
consumers and from the potential of greater integration of product lines across the region, both 
of which are reflected in the expanding intra-regional trade in Asia. The other view sees China 
and emerging Asia as competitors, specializing in the production of export goods that are 
relatively close substitutes and competing for market share in major export markets.
2  Like the 
Buddhist monk in the parable above, we think elements of both views are right.  
The first view is right in stressing many of the beneficial effects of China’s growth on the 
rest of Asia. China’s tremendous growth has indeed translated into rising imports from the rest of 
Asia. These have skyrocketed in recent years, and particularly since World Trade Organization 
(WTO) accession was completed in December 2001.  In addition, as China continues its rapid 
development, other economies in the region have an incentive to try to move up the value chain 
as their comparative advantage shifts to higher-value added, less labor-intensive industries. 
Taiwan, for example, is attracting more investment in high-tech research facilities as opposed to 
                                                 
1 Throughout the paper we use the labels “Hong Kong” to refer to “People’s Republic of China—Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region” and “Taiwan” to refer to “Taiwan Province of China”. We use the term “emerging 
Asia” to refer to the economies (other than China itself) consisting of the newly industrialized economies of Hong 
Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, as well as the so-called ASEAN-4 nations, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand.  
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pure manufacturing, and Singapore and (to a lesser extent) Malaysia are trying to broaden the 
scope of their manufacturing sectors to include bio-technology and other emerging technologies. 
But the other view is also right in claiming that China’s increased integration into the 
global economy has meant that sectoral transitions in other Asian economies are likely occurring 
at a faster pace than would otherwise have been the case. For example, popular discussions 
highlight that manufacturing has been moving from elsewhere in Asia to China, in large part to 
take advantage of low labor costs and a growing domestic market. Asian economies therefore 
need to take steps to ease the transition of their labor force into other sectors, including through 
the provision of social safety nets to ease the costs of adjustment. 
Some proponents of the “competitors” view also claim that China’s export performance 
has been greatly enhanced by an undervalued exchange rate.
3 We have less sympathy with this 
particular claim than with the general proposition of the prevalence of competition. The evidence 
we present suggests that movements in exchange rates, while important, are not the primary 
determinant of export performance among the Asian economies.   
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present evidence on the impact of 
Chinese export growth on that of other Asian economies, after controlling for the effect of 
common factors. We find that correlations between Chinese export growth and that of the NIEs 
and ASEAN-4 are almost always positive (though often not significantly so), suggesting 
complementarity rather than competition. We also present results from a VAR estimation of 
aggregate trade equations on the relative importance of foreign income and exchange rates in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 See Diwan and Hoekman (1999) and Loungani (2000). 
3 One of the most vocal proponents of this view is Bhalla (1998), whose thesis can be surmised from the 
title of his paper “Chinese Mercantilism: Currency Wars and How the East was Lost.” More recently, Williamson 
(2003) has argued that “a substantial revaluation [of the renminbi] would be good for both China and the rest of the 
world.”   3
determination of Asian export growth. An important finding is that, while exchange rates do 
matter for export performance, the income growth of trading partners matters even more. In this 
sense, China and emerging Asia are on the same side, with export performance of both still 
heavily dependent on income growth in common major trading partners, viz., the U.S., the 
European Union and Japan. (Of course, intra-regional trade alone is also becoming more 
important.) 
In Section 3, we present evidence from industry-level data on the extent of export 
competition between China and other Asian economies in the U.S. market, where competition is 
likely to have been most intense. We find that China has gained market share in the U.S. market 
as a whole and in almost every industry, while the share of the NIEs has declined. The ASEAN-4 
countries have experienced gains in market shares in slightly over have the industries. These 
changes have been occurring in a trend-like fashion over the entire period of our study—1989 to 
2002; an exception to this characterization is the rapid gains made by China in the ‘computers, 
peripherals, and semiconductors’ industry since 1998. Changes in the share of ASEAN-4 are far 
less dramatic and in many instances China and ASEAN-4 have both gained market share while 
that of the NIEs has fallen. Overall, the results are suggestive of a ‘flying geese’ pattern in which 
China and ASEAN-4 move into the product space vacated by the NIEs.  
The increased integration of China and other Asian economies does carry its own risks: It 
makes the fortunes of each side more dependent on economic developments and policy choices 
in the other than was the case in the past. In section 4, we discuss the implications of our results 
for the outlook for China and the other emerging Asian economies. In this context, we discuss 
the state of the financial sector in China, which many think is the greatest economic hurdle 
facing the country (see, for example, Lardy 1998a, 1998b).     4
 
2.  Trade Linkages between China and other Asian Economies: Aggregate Evidence 
Figure 1 shows strikingly that exports by China and by other Asian economies tend to 
move together.  The figure shows export growth (measured in dollar values) to the world from 
China (defined to include Hong Kong) and from the rest of developing Asia, using trading 
partner statistics. Fernald, Edison, and Loungani (1999) argue that it makes economic sense to 
combine data for China and Hong Kong even in the period preceding formal unification, since 
many goods use Chinese labor and Hong Kong management and distribution skills.  It makes 
statistical sense to use trading-partner statistics, to avoid double-counting Chinese and Hong 
Kong exports. 
The co-movement in export growth between China and other Asian economies suggests 
that common factors—such as growth in advanced economies, movements in the world prices of 
key exports such as semiconductors, and movements in the yen-dollar rate—were probably more 
important determinants of Asian exports than was competition with China.   
In addition, the vertical integration of many product markets in Asia would likely add to 
this similarity in growth rates.  As an example of how vertical integration might make export 
growth rates similar, take the example of a small electronic device like a DVD player.  The 
manufacturing of some components—e.g., motherboards, memory, etc.—might be handled in 
one or several of the ASEAN economies or the NIEs.  Those components are then exported to, 
say, China, where they are assembled into the DVD player.  The DVD player is then shipped out 
to its final destination.  Several economies in the region might thus provide value-added to a 
single device.  Hence, as demand for DVD players fluctuates, one would expect export growth to 
be positively correlated across countries.     5
Discussions of China’s export performance tend to emphasize factors peculiar to China, 
such as economic reform initiatives, rapid investment, tax incentives, or its WTO accession.  
More recently, some observers seem to have focused solely on the perceived undervaluation of 
the renminbi exchange rate to explain China’s export performance.  Of course, at times there are, 
indeed, China-specific factors that are likely to have a large impact on China’s exports (e.g., 
China’s WTO accession almost certainly had a larger effect on China than on its trading 
partners/competitors).  However, these discussions tend to miss the prevalence of common 
shocks, which Figure 1, as well as the evidence presented below in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, suggest 
are of equal or greater importance.  
 
2.1 Conditional  Correlations 
It may be that, in contrast to the visual impression given by Figure 1, the correlation 
between China’s export growth and export growth in other Asian countries is actually negative 
once the most important proximate determinants of Asian real export growth have been 
controlled for. To investigate this hypothesis, we estimate regressions of real export growth in a 
particular Asian economy on its proximate determinants, namely, the growth rate of foreign 
income and the (percent) change in the economy’s trade-weighted real exchange rate.  (An 
increase in the real exchange rate indicates an appreciation of the currency relative to that of its 
trading partners.)  We add China’s real export growth as a regressor to these standard export 
equations.   
The data used in the estimation are annual, and extend from 1981 to 2001.  To obtain 
sufficient degrees of freedom, we pool the data for the four NIEs (we include Hong Kong as a 
NIE), for ASEAN-4 members, and also for all eight economies.  Country fixed effects are   6
included in all regressions, but their estimates are not reported.  The coefficient estimates are 
shown in Table 1; numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  The first column presents the 
results of a regression of real export growth in the NIEs on (1) country fixed effects, (2) a lagged 
dependent variable and (3) China’s real export growth.  As shown, the coefficient estimate on 
the last of these variables is positive --0.29--and significantly different from zero (the t-statistic 
is about 3.6).  In the second column, the growth rate of foreign income and the change in the real 
exchange rate are included as regressors.  The coefficient estimates of these two variables have 
the expected signs and are statistically significantly different from zero.  For present purposes, 
the key result is that the coefficient on Chinese real export growth now drops to 0.04 (and is 
indistinguishable from zero).  Adding in lags of the independent variables, as in column (3), does 
not materially affect the conclusion that the coefficient estimate is essentially zero.  
A similar set of regressions for the ASEAN-4 group is presented in columns (4) to (6).  In 
this case, the conditional correlations are always positive and are relatively large in magnitude.  
In column (4), the simplest specification, the coefficient on China’s exports is significantly 
different from zero.  In column (5), the t-statistic falls to 1.8, implying a p-value of about 0.07.  
This regression continues to show substantial evidence of complementarity.  Adding lags of the 
independent variables, however, knocks out the statistical significance of the China variable, 
although the current and lagged values remain positive—consistent with weak complementarity.  
When data for all eight economies are pooled, the conditional correlations are similar.   
Without controls for trading partner income and the real exchange rate, there is a strong positive 
correlation between emerging Asian exports and China’s exports.  Controlling for trading partner 
income and the real exchange rate, the positive correlation is substantially weakened, although 
the sign of the effect remains.  In particular, there is now a little bit more evidence even in   7
column (9), with lagged independent variables, of weak complementarity (the p-value on 
China’s exports is about 0.09).  
Has the degree of complementarity changed in recent years? We investigate this by re-
estimating the regressions and allowing for a change in the coefficient on China’s real export 
growth starting in 1995. These regressions are reported in Table 2. As shown in the first column, 
the coefficient on the new variable is indeed negative (-0.07). But it is much smaller in 
magnitude than the coefficient on China’s real export growth itself (0.17), so that the sum of the 
two still points in the direction of complementarity. Similar conclusions hold if the break point is 
picked to be a year later than 1995, as shown in columns (2) through (6) of the table. 
In sum, when we look at data from non-China Asian emerging economies, we find that 
real exports tend to be positively correlated with China’s exports. Even controlling for major 
‘common’ shocks (trading partner income and real exchange rates), we find that conditional 
export correlations between China and other economies remain positive (although much smaller 
in magnitude and significance). These results, at a macroeconomic level, are inconsistent with 
most stories of severe, cutthroat competition between China and the rest of Asia.  
2.2  The Role of the Exchange Rate: Evidence from VARs 
As noted in the introduction, in recent years commentary has often focused on real 
exchange rates as a channel for competition among Asian economies. At the onset of the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997, for example, many observers suggested that China had undergone a large 
depreciation at the beginning of 1994, which ultimately brought pressure to bear on other Asian 
economies to devalue their own currencies. This view was challenged in IMF (1997) and 
Fernald, Edison and Loungani (1999) on two grounds.  First, there was little effective nominal 
depreciation of the renminbi at the time
, because the apparent devaluation of the official rate   8
simply unified it with the unofficial rate at which most trade transactions already took place. 
Second, the moderate real depreciation was rapidly reversed by China’s quite high inflation in 
1994 and 1995. As a result, China’s real exchange rate appreciated rather than depreciated over 
the 1993-1997 period. Nevertheless, many Asian economies did have sharp real depreciations 
whereas China did not.  
If China and emerging Asia were important competitors, such exchange rate movements 
should lead to corresponding changes in real export growth. Hence, a particular focus of the 
results in this subsection is whether movements in real exchange rates explain a large share of 
the variance in exports across Asian economies.  
In order to quantify the importance of various shocks on Asian exports, we estimate a 
simple model for Asian export growth. As before, the data used in the estimation are annual, and 
extend from 1981 to 2001.  To obtain sufficient degrees of freedom, we pool the data for all 
economies and run a panel vector autoregression (VAR) with three variables: (1) real income 
growth among major trading partners, (2) real exchange rate growth, and (3) real export growth; 
in estimating the VAR, the variables are ordered as listed, but other orderings of the variables do 
not affect the results to be described below. Two lags of each variable were included in the 
estimation. Country fixed effects are included in all regressions. 
Figure 2 presents the estimated impulse responses from the VAR showing the response of 
export growth to standard-sized (i.e., one standard deviation) increases in each of the three 
sources of shocks. Focusing on the last column, it is evident that the contemporaneous responses 
of exports to foreign income and real exchange rate movements have the expected signs and are 
statistically significant.    9
The impulse responses of interest are reproduced in Figure 3, which shows only the point 
estimates going out four years after the shock. An increase in income growth among trading 
partners leads to an increase in a “representative” Asian economy’s export growth: there is a 
strong contemporaneous, and statistically significant, impact. The impact dissipates over the next 
few years and, statistically, is not significantly different from zero. A depreciation in the 
currencies of major trading partners has the predicted adverse impact on export growth in the 
representative economy. Here too it is only the contemporaneous impact that is significantly 
different from zero.  
Table 3 presents the variance decomposition of real export growth.  As shown, income 
effects account for a much larger percentage of the variance than relative price effects.  For 
instance, at the one-year horizon, income growth accounts for 28 percent of the variance, 
compared with 10 percent for real exchange rate changes.
4 Not surprisingly, shocks to exports 
themselves show the largest dynamic response (as shown earlier in Figure 2) and also account 
for the largest share of the variance. 
These results suggest that, over the last twenty years, changes in real exchange rates have 
not been the primary determinant of export growth for the major Asian exporters. A more 
important determinant has been income growth in the major trading partners (which, over the 
bulk of our sample period, reflects growth in the industrialized countries, particularly the United 
                                                 
4 Since China had a dual exchange rate over part of our sample, we constructed an alternative measure of China’s 
real exchange rate, viz., a weighted average of the official exchange rate and the so-called 'swap market' rate. When 
this alternate measure is used in the VAR, the importance of exchange rate movements, relative to those of foreign 
income, falls even further. The impulse responses are similar to those reported in Figure 2, though again the impact 
of the exchange rates on exports is somewhat attenuated.    10
States). Industrial country demand and the effects of structural changes are likely to have 
outweighed exchange rate fluctuations as determinants of  China’s export growth.
5   
These findings can explain why, for instance, China’s export growth remained strong 
during the Asian crisis in 1997-98. Overall demand remained high (with strength in the United 
States and Europe countering weakness among Asian trading partners). As a result, export 
growth remained quite robust despite the drag from the depreciations among many Asian 
currencies. Prasad and Rumbaugh (2004) make a similar point about the more recent period. 
While acknowledging that “the recent depreciation of the U.S. dollar, to which the renminbi is 
linked, has no doubt added temporarily to China’s competiteveness,” they suggest that it is 
unlikelt that exchange rates are the primary determinant of China export growth because 
“China’s exports continued to grow rapidly virtually across the board even when the U.S. dollar 
was appreciating against other major currencies.”  
 
3.  Export Competition Among Asian Economies in the U.S. Market 
This section describes how the market shares of exports of the various Asian economies 
have changed over time. We focus on exports to the United States, which is likely to have been 
the market where competition has been most intense. In addition to looking at changes in the 
overall market share (i.e. exports across all industries combined), we present evidence on 
changes in two high-profile industries which were identified in our previous work as being ones 
                                                 
5 Chinese export growth has also been helped by structural reforms of the exchange and trade system, as detailed in 
Cerra and Dayal-Gulati (1999). Examples include allowing local governments and exporting enterprises to retain a 
proportion of foreign exchange receipts, eliminating mandatory export and import planning, and opening up the 
economy to foreign direct investment. Despite occasional reversals, the overall trend has been to reduce the role of 
central planning in China’s foreign trade.   11
that displayed large changes in trade shares and accounted for a sizable fraction of total U.S. 
imports from these Asian economies.    
By focusing on relative export performance in a single geographic region and for specific 
industries, we hope to obtain product-level evidence on “export competition.” For these 
purposes, we define export competition as “shifts in market share” across the three groups.  In 
particular, we want to see if China’s market share has increased markedly within a particular 
industry.  
Note that by focusing on shares in particular markets we are strongly stacking the deck in 
favor of the export-competition view. After all, since shares sum to 100 percent, it is 
arithmetically impossible for all shares to move in the same direction. So a country may have its 
share in a particular market decline without necessarily experiencing a decline in the level of its 
exports to that market.  It may be losing market share in one market but gaining it in another. 
Moreover, some changes in shares may be deliberate, as in the case of industries that have 
shifted to a more vertically integrated approach to manufacturing. 
Nevertheless, the changing shares give some sense of how trade patterns are evolving in 
the various countries. Also, from the perspective of a producer within a narrow industry, these 
figures give some sense of who they are competing against. Thus, the changing trade patterns 
discussed here provide indirect evidence on whether China and emerging Asia are truly 
comrades or competitors. 
For this analysis, the Asian economies we consider have been classified into one of three 
groups: China (China and Hong Kong), the NIEs (Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan), and the 
ASEAN-4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand). While the analysis focuses on the 
period 1996 to 2002, some tables also provide data for 1989 and 1993 to provide a longer-term   12
perspective on the changes in trade shares. The data are at the three-digit industry level and are 
published by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).   
As a preamble to the industry-level analysis, Table 4 shows export shares for the three 
groups for the U.S. market as a whole. As shown, in 1989 China and Hong Kong together 
accounted for about a quarter of total exports to the United States from the three groups. By 
1993, China’s share had increased to a third. Mainland China alone nearly doubled its share of 
the U.S. market, helped perhaps by the real depreciation of the renminbi over this period. The 
ASEAN-4 group also increased its market share, but by a smaller magnitude than the increase in 
mainland China’s share.  Correspondingly, the share of the NIEs fell from 59 percent to 44 
percent.  There is, therefore, some evidence of “competition”—shifts in market share—among 
the three groups over the period 1989 to 1993.  By contrast, the period between 1993 and 1997 is 
far more tranquil.  The shares of China and ASEAN-4 inch up over this period at the expense of 
the NIEs.  
The Asian crisis, and the associated sharp real depreciations in the currencies of many 
Asian economies, did not lead to any dramatic changes in market shares: The relative stability 
that characterized the period 1993 to 1997 continued through 2000.  In the most recent period, 
from 2000 to 2002, however, China’s share grows from 40 percent to 49 percent, at the expense 
of both the NIEs and the ASEAN-4.  Thus, only in the most recent period do we see strong signs 
of competition. 
Next, we examine industry-level data. Table 5 presents for 1989 and 2002 for the three 
country groups and covering each of the 48 industries that make up the aggregate. The table 
contains a huge amount of data but some salient features do emerge. First, there is no doubt that 
China has emerged as a significant exporter across virtually the entire spectrum of industries: its   13
share has increased in 42 industries. In contrast, there are only five industries in which the NIE 
share is higher in 2002 than in 1989 and these are all in the industrial supplies and materials 
category (1-digit code ‘1’).
6  In addition, there is one industry, 300 (new and used passenger 
cars), in which the NIEs have maintained a 100 percent share of U.S. imports from emerging 
Asia since 1989, although with foreign direct investment in China’s auto sector growing rapidly, 
it may not be too long before China starts exporting autos. Second, increases in the shares of 
ASEAN-4 are also quite prevalent, increasing in 26 of the 48 industries. This means that cases in 
which the shares of both China and ASEAN-4 have increased are just as likely as cases in which 
their shares have moved in the opposite direction.  
Overall, the message from Table 5 is that China and ASEAN-4 appear to have been 
moving into the product space vacated by the NIEs. The evidence is only reinforced if one takes 
into account the amount of imports from Asia in each industry, which is shown in the last 
column of Table 5. In each of the five largest industries, the shares of China and ASEAN-4 have 
moved in the same direction (these are industries 213, 302, 410, 411 and 412). 
We now turn to a more detailed analysis of the two largest industries based on U.S. 
imports in 2002, namely, industry 213 (computers, peripherals and semi-conductors) and 
industry 400 (apparel, footwear and household products). First consider the changes in industry 
213 (Table 6).  Here, mainland China’s market share rose from essentially zero in 1989 to 7 
percent in 1997; however, over half of this increase appears to have come at the expense of Hong 
Kong.  When the two are combined, their market share increases only slightly over the period.  
The share of ASEAN-4 increases somewhat more substantially, with a corresponding fall in the 
                                                 
6 They are 100 (petroleum and products), 123 (other agricultural products and textile supplies), 140 (unmanufactured 
steelmaking and ferroalloying materials), 142 (crude and semifinished nonferrous metals), and 160 (unfinished   14
share of the NIEs.  In the period since the onset of the Asian financial crisis, both China and 
ASEAN-4 have continued to gain market share at the expense of the NIEs. 
The story in the case of industry 400 is a bit different (Table 7). Here, China does 
experience a big increase in market share between 1989 and 1997, from 36 percent to 63 percent, 
with the bulk of this increase occurring between 1989 and 1993.  The share of the ASEAN-4 also 
increased over the period, with the change being more substantial in the earlier part of the period. 
 Since the onset of the crisis, there has been virtual constancy in market shares, with the NIEs 
losing only a small portion of their shares to China since 2000. 
In sum, contrary to some popular perceptions, China’s gains in market share have not 
come about primarily at the expense of the labor-intensive ASEAN-4 economies.  Instead, China 
displaced the NIEs in industries that these more advanced economies were 
relinquishing―apparel, footwear, and household products.  This is a healthy, rather than 
disturbing, development.  It mimics an earlier period, when the NIEs moved into the industries 
relinquished by a more advanced Japan. 
Even when the period is extended to include 1994 to 2000, there was virtual stability in 
export shares of the three Asian groups (China, the NIEs and the ASEAN-4) both at the 
aggregate level and in key industries.
7  To the extent that there were small gains in China’s 
export shares in this period, these continued to come largely by displacing the NIEs.  The 
significant real depreciations of the currencies of the “Asian crisis” economies did not have the 
dramatic impact on market shares that would have been expected if exchange rate movements 
were a strong factor behind export growth. 
                                                                                                                                                             
nonmetals). 
7  In our previous work we showed that this stability of export shares holds in the United States, and appears to hold   15
In the most recent period, however, from 2000 to 2002, we see the shares starting to 
change once again.  In fact, China’s share has risen considerably, primarily at the expense of the 
NIEs, and to a lesser extent at the expense of the ASEAN-4.  Some of this change may be due to 
the shifting of low-value-added production to China, while these economies, particularly the 
NIEs, focus on higher-value-added production.  In that case, it would represent a healthy change 
for both China and the NIEs, as each would be focusing on the area in which it has a 
comparative advantage: China in low-value-added, labor-intensive manufacturing, and the NIEs 
in high-value-added, capital-intensive manufacturing.  Another explanation may be that the role 
of the exchange rate in determining exports has increased in importance recently.  
 
3.2  The Destination of Asian NIE Exports 
  An interesting fact that emerges from the data is that the NIEs are losing import shares in 
the U.S. market in almost all categories of goods at the same time that their overall exports are 
growing. This raises an obvious question: “Where are exports from the NIEs going?”  In Table 7, 
we attempt to answer this using data from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS).
8  The 
table shows the average annual growth rate of exports from China, the NIEs, and the ASEAN-4, 
as we have defined them in this paper, to the world, the G-3 (defined here as the United States, 
Japan, and European Union, which we use as a proxy for industrial countries), China, the NIEs, 
and the ASEAN-4.
9  The growth rates are broken down into the three time periods we identified 
                                                                                                                                                             
in Japan and many major European markets as well. 
8 The data is augmented with data from the CEIC database as needed.  In particular, data for Taiwan are not up to 
date in the DOTS database. 
 
9 So, for example, exports from the ASEAN-4 to the ASEAN-4 represent total exports from each of the ASEAN-4 
countries to the other three countries in the ASEAN-4–in essence, an intra-subregional trade measure.  Similarly, 
exports from China to China capture mainland China's exports to Hong Kong and Hong Kong's exports to the   16
earlier: the first period of China’s increasing shares from 1989-1993, the relatively stable shares 
period from 1993-2000, and the recent period in which China’s shares have risen rapidly from 
2000-2002. 
  In the early period, it is obvious that China’s share of the G-3 import market was growing 
at the expense of the NIEs. The average growth in Chinese exports to the G-3 was almost 20 
percent during that period, while NIE export growth to the G-3 was just 2 percent. However, 
NIE exports to China were growing at almost a 30 percent annual rate at that time. In the stable 
share period from 1993-2000, the export growth rates of all three groups were fairly similar. The 
NIEs experienced a more rapid period of export growth to the G-3, perhaps due to the U.S. high-
tech boom, and the NIEs exports to China continued to rise, albeit at a slower rate.  In the final 
period, however, the differences are striking.  In this period of rapid increases in shares for China 
in the U.S. import market, both the NIEs and ASEAN-4 have experienced falling exports to just 
about every group except China.
10 
  We offer two explanations for the rise in NIE exports to China and the relative weakness 
of exports to the G-3.  First, demand in China remained strong throughout the period we 
examined, despite several episodes of global weakness. Most noticeably, during the 2000-2002 
period, the U.S. high-tech bubble burst, global demand fell, and yet China continued to grow at a 
robust pace. Thus, it is not surprising that exports to China rose significantly in that period.  
Second, the shifting of production facilities to China from the NIEs likely has boosted NIE 
                                                                                                                                                             
mainland. 
 
10 Prasad and Rumbaugh (2004) present complementary evidence by looking at how important China has become to 
various countries as a destination for their exports. In the case of some of the Asian NIEs the increase in the 
importance of China as an export destination has been quite dramatic. For example, China has gone from accounting 
from under 0.1 percent of Korea’s exports in 1990 to over 10 percent in 2000 and nearly 15 percent in 2002. 
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exports of intermediate prodcuts to China for processing and export of the finished product.
11 
The data presented here do not shed light on the relative importance of these two explanations, 
but it is likely that both are partly responsible. 
  
4.  Implications of Regional Integration 
We have shown there is little evidence to support the view that competition from China 
above that China and emerging Asia are competitors at the sectoral level. However, at an 
aggregate level their relationship is much more complementary. This complementarity results in 
part from growing trade links that tie the fortunes of China and emerging Asia more closely 
together. As a result, economies throughout Asia are more dependent on economic developments 
and policies in China than they were previously. Closer integration with China, therefore, 
represents not only an opportunity for the economies of emerging Asia, but also a potential 
source of macroeconomic risk. In this section, we describe channels through which 
macroeconomic developments in China are likely to spill over to elsewhere in Asia, and briefly 
discuss several aspects of the outlook for economic activity in China and emerging Asia. 
Why might greater trade integration in Asia be expected to increase the transmission of 
shocks between economies in the region?  One obvious reason is that China has become a source 
of demand for final goods produced in emerging Asia. From this perspective, the rise of China is 
a positive factor for growth in emerging Asia. For example, Korean exports of steel products to 
China have surged recently, reflecting robust spending on infrastructure and other construction 
                                                 
11 For a detailed discussion of the rise in intraregional trade in Asia, see Zebregs (2003). He concludes that “the rise 
in intraregional trade is largely driven by rapidly growing intra-industry trade, which is a reflection of greater 
vertical specialization and the dispersion of production processes across borders. This has led to a sharp rise in trade 
in intermediate goods ... but the EU, Japan and the United States remain the main export markets for final goods.”   18
projects in China. But, by the same token, a significant downturn in China’s economy would be 
expected to have a negative impact on the exports of emerging Asian economies. 
In addition, greater integration of product lines across the region means that 
developments in China increasingly matter for the rest of Asia. As mentioned earlier, a 
significant portion of the final assembly of Asian-made products takes place in China. As a 
result, disruptions in China could potentially create a bottleneck in the production of a wide 
range of goods. An economic crisis in China could cripple numerous product lines, hurting 
corporations from emerging Asia that do business in China. Another example would be the 
imposition by advanced countries of tariffs on goods imported from China. Demand for 
intermediate inputs (possibly produced elsewhere in Asia) used in the production of these goods 
would likely decline as a result of such tariffs.    
More generally, shocks to China’s economy are likely to be transmitted to emerging Asia 
through confidence effects. By now, China’s economy is so large and so integrated with the rest 
of Asia that investor sentiment toward emerging Asia depends in part on what happens in China. 
We now briefly discuss the outlooks and risks faced by China and the economies of emerging 
Asia. 
Many observers believe that the health of China’s financial system represents the greatest 
risk to the country. For example, concerns have been raised about Chinese banks’ ability to 
compete with foreign banks, which are being permitted to enter the Chinese market gradually as 
part of China’s WTO accession.
12  If depositors were to shift large amounts of funds from 
                                                 
12 At present, foreign banks are not currently allowed to conduct local-currency business with domestic Chinese 
entities.  Under the terms of China’s WTO accession agreement, however, these restrictions will be lifted over the next 
several years.  In particular, foreign banks are supposed to be permitted to conduct local-currency business with 
Chinese firms starting in December 2003, and with retail customers in 2006.   19
domestic banks to foreign banks, many domestic banks might find themselves illiquid.  If the 
government is then forced to rescue these banks, the most accessible source of funding is the 
central bank. Then the government may face the undesirable choice of seeing an increase in 
inflation, or a substantial slowdown in growth (as banks are unable to extend new loans and are 
forced to call in outstanding ones). 
Over recent years, however, the government has made some progress in its efforts to 
reform the major state-owned commercial banks that dominate the banking system.  These 
efforts include partially cleaning up China banks’ mountains of bad loans–in large part a legacy 
of directed lending under central planning–by transferring a large chunk of bad loans to asset 
management companies in 1999.  Despite the initial transfer, bad loans have remained quite 
high, and banks efforts to write them off have been lackluster at best, resulting in only a slow 
decline in NPL ratios.  
13  The recently formed China Banking Regulatory Commission has just 
announced some encouraging plans for accelerating reforms of the banking system, but only 
time will tell how well those plans are put into effect. 
Weaknesses in China’s banking system are closely intertwined with problems in the 
country’s state enterprise sector. China has made some progress in reforming  state enterprises. 
Many small firms have been privatized or shut down, while larger firms have shed some surplus 
labor.  However, reform has been hindered by concerns about social unrest that could develop if 
large groups of working-age people remain unemployed for long periods of time.  China does 
not yet have a fully functional social welfare system--at least by industrial country standards--
and hence maintaining low levels of unemployment is important from a social stability 
                                                 
13 For discussions of how to deal with the bad loans of the banking system, see Lardy (1998b ) and Bonin and Huang 
(2001).   20
perspective.  This problem is exacerbated by the flow of recent college graduates, whose 
numbers were boosted by increased emphasis on education in the late-1990s. 
The problem of surplus labor is even more acute in rural areas.  In recent years, the 
already large gap between urban and rural incomes has increased, and the threat of resulting 
massive rural-to-urban migration may cause China’s leadership to slow the reform process, not 
least because mass urbanization will require enormous fiscal spending.  The long-run fiscal costs 
of resolving the banks’ bad loans problem, reforming the state enterprises and financing a new 
social welfare system also raise concerns about whether the reform process is fiscally 
sustainable. 
Observers have also questioned whether massive capital flight could put pressure on the 
currency and balance of payments, given evidence that China’s capital controls can be easily 
evaded.  Capital flight is currently not an issue, however, as errors and omissions in the balance 
of payments (sometimes used as a measure of capital flight) turned from large outflows over the 
period 1995 to 2001, averaging about $14 billion, to a large inflow of about $8 billion in 2002.  
The recent change has been driven by speculation about a change in the exchange rate regime 
that would permit the renminbi to appreciate against the dollar, thus raising the value of renminbi 
assets.  In the long term, however, the fear is that capital outflows, for example caused by a 
sudden loss of confidence in the banking system or by an opening of capital controls, could lead 
to capital flight.  Given the size and continued growth of international reserves, though, China 
may be better situated to handle this situation than other countries. 
Despite all of these potential pitfalls, the consensus is that China will continue to grow at 
a robust pace in the medium- to long-term, boosted by the continued reforms and improvements   21
in productivity. This would be positive for emerging Asia, the outlook for which we now briefly 
discuss. 
Economies in emerging Asia rebounded sharply from the Asian crisis, before being 
battered in 2001 by the falloff in U.S. growth, weakness in Japan, and the plunge in global 
demand for high-tech products.  The region suffered another blow in 2003 when it was hard-hit 
by SARS.  However, recent signs have been more encouraging and most analysts expect a return 
to robust growth as the region benefits from stronger demand among leading trading partners and 
the global recovery in demand for high-tech products. 
Two downside risks, however, are worthy of mention. First, in many countries, the 
financial restructuring that began after the Asian crisis is still incomplete. To the extent that such 
reforms remain incomplete, inefficient financial sectors may weigh on performance and 
exacerbate vulnerabilities over the medium term. Second, our results suggest that competition 
from China for export-market share is growing. Emerging Asia will need new strategies to move 
up the value chain and develop economies that are more knowledge-based.  Greater levels of 
foreign direct investment may play a role in achieving these objectives. It is important to 
reiterate that, notwithstanding increased competition, China's rapid growth represents a 
significant opportunity for emerging Asia. China's imports have grown in lock step with its 
exports, and China is thus an important source of demand for goods from emerging Asian.  Thus 




5.  Conclusions 
 
We find little evidence overall that increases in China’s exports reduce exports of other   22
emerging Asian economies.  Indeed, it appears that China’s exports and exports of the other 
economies are positively correlated. The correlation appears largely driven by common shocks—
such as trading partner income—but even after controlling for the major sources of common 
shocks, the correlation remains weak but positive.  
Nevertheless, when one looks at specific products, there is clearly considerable shifting of 
trade patterns taking place.  It seems likely that these shifts require actual shifts in resource 
allocations, which can often be painful for those who lose out.  From this perspective, China and 
emerging Asia are competitors.  The appropriate policy response, however, would be to take 
steps to smooth the flow of resources across sectors.   23
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Table 1 
Conditional Correlations between China’s Real Export Growth and Real Export Growth in other Asian 
Economies 
 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0.29     
(0.08)
0.03     
(0.10)
0.08     
(0.10)
0.48     
(0.11)
0.22    
(0.13)
0.11    
(0.13)
0.38     
(0.07)
0.11    
(0.08)
0.13    
(0.09)
Lag 1 . .
0.09     
(0.14) ..
0.22    
(0.17) ..
0.09    
(0.11)
Lag 2 . .
-0.03    
(0.13) ..
0.17     
(0.19) ..
-0.01    
(0.13)
.
3.16     
(0.63)
3.87     
(0.93) .
2.97     
(0.69)
5.22     
(1.23) .
3.13    
(0.47)
4.13     
(0.83)
Lag 1 . .
-1.60    
(0.73) ..
-0.04    
(0.12) ..
-1.06   
(0.62)
Lag 2 . .
1.16     
(0.54) ..
0.03     
(0.81) ..
0.58     
(0.55)
.
-0.38    
(0.13)
-0.37    
(0.10) .
-0.32    
(0.12)
-0.29    
(0.06) .
-0.33   
(0.10)
-0.37   
(0.08)
Lag 1 . .
-0.37    
(0.12) ..
0.30    
(0.08) ..
0.15    
(0.10)
Lag 2 . .
-0.09    
(0.14) ..
0.11    
(0.08) ..
-0.05    
(0.07)
0.12     
(0.11)
0.14     
(0.10)
0.14    
(0.10)
-0.08    
(0.10)
-0.05    
(0.09)
-0.02    
(0.13)
-0.01    
(0.08)
0.02    
(0.07)
0.12    
(0.09)
0.07 0.34 0.44 0.19 0.41 0.49 0.14 0.39 0.39 Adjusted R
2














Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis.  Regression estimated as a panel from 1981 – 2001.  All 
regressions include country fixed effects (not shown).  Data are from IFS and National Income 
accounts data from country sources.   26
Table 2 
Regressions with Break in Coefficient on China’s Exports  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
China's Real Export 0.17  (0.10) 0.21   (0.11) 0.14   (0.10) 0.12  (0.09)
0.11    
(0.09) 0.09  (0.09)
Change in Chinas Export 














1999 . . . . 0.00  (0.08) .
2000 ..... 0 . 0 6   (0.07)
Foreign Demand 2.97   (0.48) 2.85   (0.49) 3.05   (0.49) 3.09   (0.48)
3.13    
(0.48)















Lagged Dependent Variable 0.01  (0.07) 0.00   (0.08)
0.01    
(0.07)
0.01    
(0.07) 0.02   (0.07)
0.02    
(0.07)
Adj. R2 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38  
 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis.  Regression estimated as a panel from 1981 – 
2001 with all eight economies (NIEs and ASEAN-4).  All regressions include country 
fixed effects (not shown).  Coefficient on China’s exports is allowed to change in the 
year shown in the table.  Hence, before the year the coefficient changes, the coefficient 
on China’s exports is shown on line 1; for the year the coefficient changes and after, the 
coefficient on China’s exports is the sum of the coefficient on China’s exports (line 1) 
and the change in the coefficient.     27
Table 3 
Variance Decomposition of Asian Export Growth 
 
   
 
Step   Income   Exchange  Exports   
Rate    
 
1   28    10   62   
2   27    12   61 
3   28    13   59 
4   28    13   59 
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Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
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Code China  NIE’s  ASEAN China NIE’s  ASEAN 
Total Imports from 
Asia  
2002 
(US $ billions) 
000  0 3  96 1 2  98  0.3 
001  22 17 62 34 14 52  2.2 
002  2  4 93 20  4 76  0.2 
010  22 29 49 30  8 62  3.1 
100 21 9  70  18  42  40  1.8 
101 71 1  29  72 0  28  0.1 
103 98 0 2  100 0 0  0.1 
104  0 0 0 0 0 0  0.0 
110  24 75  1 35  0 65  0.0 
111  19 76  5 26 58 16  0.5 
120 13 5  82  25 5  69  1.3 
121  29 56 16 28 55 17  3.0 
123 16  37  46 8  84 8  0.1 
125  22 70  9 44 39 17  3.2 
130  2 28 70 58  6 36  1.5 
131  8 75 17 62 12 27  1.5 
140 68 5  27  79  14 7  0.1 
141  1 96  3 17 71 12  0.9 
142  52 14 33 60 30 11  0.4 
150  10 80 10 33 55 11  0.8 
151  12 86  3 36 61  3  1.8 
152  18 78  4 56 36  8  1.5 
160  63 19 18 65 30  6  0.2 
161  23 67 10 48 44  9  4.4 
200  22 70  8 55 31 14  8.3 
210  4 75 21 36 54 10  0.7 
211  16 82  2 50 44  6  9.9 
212  11 86  4 52 45  3  0.3 
213  7 72 21 24 42 34  67.8 
214  21 66 13 39 30 31  7.8 
215  28 66  6 72 14 14  1.8 
216  20 49 31 37 31 32  2.8 
220  10 86  4 22 72  6  0.5 
221  16 83  2 73 26  1  0.0 
222  11 83  6 37 55  8  0.1 
223  0  100  0 14 22 64  0.0 
300  0  100 0 0  100 0  6.9 
301  0 99  0 70 28  2  0.0 
302  11 75 13 34 43 23  6.5 
400  36 52 12 69 12 20  41.1 
401  46 46  8 64 30  5  6.5 
410  24 66 10 67 22 11  38.8 
411  38 57  5 84 11  6  19.4 
412  19 64 18 53 17 30  17.1 
413  48 23 29 67  5 28  4.0 
420  16 40 45 34 39 27  0.0 
421  34 38 28 71 10 19  1.2 
500  27 58 15 34 47 19  5.9  
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Table 6 
Export Shares of Selected Asian Economies in the U.S. Market:  
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Table 7 
Export Shares of Selected Asian Economies in the U.S. Market:  
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Average Annual Growth of Exports from Emerging Asia by Region 
 
   World G-3 China  NIE’s  ASEAN-4 
China  15.8 18.6 12.7 17.6 13.2 
NIE’s  9.3  2.4 27.7 15.7 16.9 
1989-
1993 
ASEAN-4  15.3 12.8 19.8 20.7 17.3 
China  10.3 11.2  8.2 12.0 13.6 
NIE’s  9.3  8.7 11.2 13.9 10.7 
1993-
2000 
ASEAN-4  10.6  9.4 13.7 10.7 18.1 
China  8.0 5.7 9.6 7.7  14.0 
NIE’s  -4.6 -9.8  7.2 -8.2 -5.2 
2000-
2002 
ASEAN-4  -0.9 -4.0 15.7 -4.4  2.7 
 
 
Source:  IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. 












































World Imports from China/HK (net of
internal china/hk trade)
World Imports from Developing Asia
(excl. China and Hong Kong)
 
 
Note:  The solid line shows recorded imports by all countries in the world from either China or 
Hong Kong, excluding China’s imports from Hong Kong and Hong Kong’s imports from China. 
The dashed line shows imports by all countries in the world from developing Asian economies 
other than China or Hong Kong.   Data source is IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics.  











































































































Note:  The columns show the impulse responses of the indicated variable to each of the shocks.  
The shocks are indicated by the row labels.  Each of the figures shows the impulse-response 
point estimates as well as 2 standard-deviation bounds (from 1000 RATS Monte Carlo draws) 
from a panel VAR, as described in the text.  
























Notes:  Lines show estimated impulse responses from a panel VAR of Asian emerging economy 
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